An All-Powerful God: Can Religious Morality be Grounded in Divine Authority?
Agnostic or atheist, let us envision a world in which God – an all-powerful, all-knowing , omnibenevolent being – undoubtedly exists. This begs the question, what kind of just creator allows evil to run free? Not only that, but how can we be sure his authority reigns truly supreme and is valid? To begin to understand the grounds of religious morality, the omnipotence of God and the existence of evil, we must start with the metaphysics.
Considered the finest approach to the first dilemma, Leibniz’s theodicy explains the seemingly contradictory nature of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being creating a world harboring evils. It argues that there are other possible worlds God could have brought into being, but as a perfectly good and omniscient entity, He must have been acting on the principle of sufficient reason (everything exists on the basis of sufficient reason, however they are reasons we cannot know) ; therefore this existing world is doubtlessly the best of all potential worlds, or He would not have conceived it. Leibniz states that this natural evil plays
a role in the deterrence of a more significant evil. However, one could argue that if the possibility of greater evil exists, there must be lesser degrees of evil.
His monadology elucidates the reason why a perfect world would be impossible. According to Leibniz, the most basic substances that make up the universe are monads, of an infinite amount and of which none are identical, and all are conscious. Unlike atoms, they are true unities, metaphysically prior to space and therefore immaterial as well as indivisible. On the peak of the hierarchy there lies the monad – the Supreme Being, the fundamental principle of the universe ; God. The creation of the world was through God bringing forth a certain (also the best possible) combination of substances. As identical substances cannot exist, there must only be one perfect entity, namely the supreme monad. Others merely bear more minor, differing degrees of perfection – each have limited capacity for perfection due to differing natures and compositions.
Evidently, God made as many monads as possible in the creation of the universe. However, Leibniz claims that He could not eradicate ‘metaphysical evil’ (the absence of perfection), implying that there are limitations or obstacles God is unable to overcome. This is quite a contradiction to God’s omnipotence, the fact that He can create but not eliminate certain substances He Himself created, which in turn insinuates that there are things that lie beyond God. It could also mean that God creates evil due to its necessity, but does not will it so. Every limitation is considered a defect and weakness and every defect is considered as a kind of evil. This raises the question of whether God is truly perfect, given the aforementioned restrictions of His, although that can be refuted by claiming that metaphysical evil is imperative for the making of a universe of all possibilities ; the evil that permeates the world is the constraint of all possible beings below God's omniperfection.
If God possesses an eternally superior wisdom, and is perfect, should we justify our actions exclusively through divine authority? To prove the validity of His authority would be an arduous feat. Divine approval cannot be justified solely because it comes from God. Even if God’s authority is based on the fact that he is all-knowing, (as Leibniz stated) we do not know the reasoning for His moral values. Are there absolute morals that even God must acknowledge, or are those standards morally binding because He commands it? We do not know if something is evil because God condemns it, or if God condemns it because it is inherently evil. If the former proves to be true, God’s wishes are irrational and arbitrary – rendering the definition of morality a devotion to tyrannical power. However, if they are not conceived by God, that weakens the superiority of His authority. The question of whether morality should be grounded in the authority of God remains a heated debate.
Leibniz’s theodicy, while seemingly an adequate response to the contradictions regarding God and evils, is not able to illustrate what lies behind God’s sufficient reason, which undermines his divine authority – the grounds of religious morality still ultimately rest in uncertainty.